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The disappointing performance of integrated conservation and development projects
has been partly blamed on the lack of linkage between the development intervention
and the expected conservation outcome, resulting in projects that rarely achieve the
sought-after ‘‘win–win’’ outcomes. While this study replicates findings about the
difficulties of establishing successful linkages, it also seeks to go beyond problem
identification, by evaluating responses initiated within a long-term conservation
initiative, the International Gorilla Conservation Programme, that has since 1991
worked with communities as part of its efforts to protect mountain gorillas and their
habitats. The principal lesson that emerges from interviews with IGCP partner orga-
nizations relates to the benefits of a ‘‘conservation logic’’ in which conservation and
development outcomes are linked through mutual dependence but also contractual
conditionality.
Keywords Albertine Rift, community conservation, conservation enterprise,
Democratic Republic of Congo, integrated conservation and development,
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The belief that conservation and poverty alleviation should be addressed in tandem
has proved appealing to a wide range of stakeholders because of the promise of con-
servation effectiveness while avoiding the moral hazard of being anti-poor. However,
the performance of integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) has
widely been reported as disappointing (Brandon and Wells 1992; Wells et al. 1999;
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Hulme and Murphree 2001; Wells and McShane 2004). The case for pursuing con-
servation through development has included arguments that development interven-
tions reduce dependence on park resources (Cavendish 2000; Masozera and
Alavalapati 2004); incentivize conservation-oriented behavior (Ferraro 2001); enable
local people to integrate longer term concerns into their decision making (Moseley
2001); and spread goodwill toward the park (Barrow and Murphree 2001). In light
of poor performance, these reasons and their underlying assumptions have come
under more critical scrutiny. Regarding subsidies for agriculture, one of the most
common development interventions used in ICDPs, there is, at best, no clear logic
to explain why such interventions should lead to conservation (Brandon and Wells
1992; Salafsky and Wollenberg 2000); at worst, such interventions could incentivize
forest clearance by making agriculture a more profitable land use relative to forest
(Wunder 2001; Ferraro 2001; Ferraro and Simpson 2005).
This article contributes to this strand of ICDP literature that poses critical
questions about the mechanisms for establishing linkages between development
interventions and conservation objectives. The article goes beyond the existing
critique by seeking to learn from recent efforts to improve upon the disappointing
performance of early ICDP efforts. It addresses the question of the potential for
conservation and development programs to learn from past experience and design
initiatives that better link conservation and development objectives. In answering
this question, we generate derivative questions about monitoring and scale: First,
how can strong monitoring and information systems improve linkage between con-
servation and development objectives? Second, is community-level integration of
conservation and development objectives facilitated by management systems that
are integrated at landscape scale?
We address these questions through a case study of the International Gorilla
Conservation Programme (IGCP), which operates in and around four national
parks. Three contiguous parks make up the Virunga Massif forest block: Parc
National des Virunga (PNVi) in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); Parc
National des Volcans (PNV) in Rwanda; and Mgahinga Gorilla National Park
(MGNP) in Uganda. The fourth is 30 km to the north, the Bwindi Impenetrable
National Park (BINP) in Uganda. These parks protect remaining fragments of
montane rainforest considered of high conservation priority due to their species
richness and endemism (Plumptre et al. 2003). PNVi and PNV were formed in
1925 and 1929, respectively. MGNP and BINP were given forms of protective
designation in the early 1930s, but only became national parks in 1991, leading
to loss of resources for some local people and resentment (Hamilton et al.
2000; Blomley 2003; Adams and Infield 2003). The protection of mountain gor-
illas, despite the difficult circumstances of poverty and conflict, is widely regarded
as a conservation success, albeit a fragile one (Kalpers et al. 2003; McNeilage
et al. 2006).
Methods
Given that we are interested in responses to the early disappointment with ICDPs, we
mostly concentrate our analysis on IGCP initiatives introduced since 2000. This
analysis takes an institutional approach, interpreting individual behavior as a
response to the human-made constraints that frame their decisions (Parsons 2007).
The institutions of interest here are formal public and private organizations and less






























formal norms and customs. We pay particular attention to those institutional
settings that constrain economic rules of the game and that may be considered as
determinants of economic decision making.
The research was led by an independent researcher from the University of East
Anglia alongside IGCP co-investigators. The IGCP team members served roles both
as research respondents and as investigators, an arrangement requiring measures to
avoid bias. First, all primary data collection (interviews) was undertaken by the aca-
demic researcher, not by IGCP staff members. Second, during data analysis, the data
from non-IGCP respondents were always available for comparison with those of
IGCP respondents, thus allowing reflection on different perceptions of the same
phenomena.
The main data collection method was qualitative interviews carried out in 2008
with 62 purposively selected representatives from key implementation partners. There
were two main reasons for targeting IGCP’s partners: First, previous research had
already surveyed local people but not conservation professionals (e.g., Blomley 2003;
Baker 2004; Plumptre et al. 2004), and second, these stakeholders have a depth of
experience that we expected to shed light on the research questions. Respondents
included members of IGCP itself, members of the three park authorities, including
directors, chief wardens, wardens, and rangers, and representatives from a range of
partner nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based associations.
Interviews were qualitative, beginning with respondents describing in detail their role
in community conservation work and then identifying and exploring their perceptions
of strengths and weaknesses of IGCP’s community-based operations. Data analysis
was largely inductive, as befits a case-study approach. Following an initial reading of
interview transcripts, a system of coding was employed to organize the data and
ultimately to identify emergent lessons and to abstract data associated with these.
Results
Is It Possible to Design Community Development Initiatives That Are Sufficiently
Well Linked to Conservation Objectives to Enable Win–Win Outcomes?
While using a variety of descriptive terms, respondents frequently referred to what
we call the ‘‘conservation logic’’ of a project: that component of project design that
should in principle promote conservation-oriented behavior. For example, one of
IGCP’s development interventions has been the provision of water tanks. Some of
these projects have a conservation logic because the new water source provides an
acceptable alternative to people who previously entered the forest to collect water.
Some, however, have a less discernable conservation logic, where the community
never relied on entering the park for water in the first place. In the latter case, the
water facility may be an excellent development project and desirable in its own
right—but it may not have a conservation outcome. Our analysis of IGCP practice
identifies three principal forms of conservation logic. The first of these we find to be
weak when operating in isolation. The second and third are potentially stronger, but
in practice will also benefit from use in combination.
1. Income-Demand Function. This conservation logic is widely employed, but we
find little evidence that it links development to conservation in practice. At its heart
is the assumption that income growth leads to reduced demand for natural resources,






























as popularized through influential international documents such as the Brundtland
report (WCED 1987). We propose that this is a weak form of conservation logic
due to the assumptions made by proponents. We list three assumptions here and
then proceed to explain why they are problematic.
. First, it builds on an untested assumption that people have a finite need for
‘‘inferior goods’’ gathered from forests. If projects can help people to meet this
required resource level from activities outside the park, demand will decline. So,
for example, if people earn enough money to buy meat in markets, they will
not need to go poaching.
. Second, it assumes that people are time-constrained and have to allocate and
prioritize their labor. When out-of-park activities are subsidized, they will there-
fore switch their time allocation away from in-park activities.
. Third, for the preceding two assumptions to hold, it must also be assumed that
substitution between resources is possible. If you don’t poach, you buy meat at a
market; if you don’t collect bamboo from the forest, you buy alternative poles at
a market. Markets enable people to specialize in out-of-park activities such as agri-
culture and use the derived income to purchase substitutes for forest-based resources.
One relevant example of the income-demand conservation logic is the ‘‘fuel
ladder hypothesis,’’ which states that rising income reduces demand for ‘‘lower
order’’ fuels such as forest wood, and increases demand for ‘‘higher order’’ fuels such
as charcoal, gas, or electricity (Barnes and Floor 1996; Arnold et al. 2003). The
switch is based on the perceived inferiority of wood fuel. Where income generating
opportunities improve, it makes less sense to allocate labor time to forest collection
and better sense to purchase alternatives in local markets. The weakness with this
conservation logic is that the assumptions don’t always hold. The poorest people liv-
ing around the Virunga massif are not the only ones to use forest resources and
demand is not entirely dependent on wealth. For example, the quality of some bush
meat is noted, and likewise bamboo is sometimes observed to be a superior roofing
material. In other words, some forest resources behave like ‘‘normal’’ rather than
‘‘inferior’’ goods. Furthermore, in this area, markets for both resources and labor
are imperfect, a problem for resource and labor switching anticipated by Ferraro
(2001). Overall, we must be aware that the relationship between poverty and
resource use can vary substantially, even across relatively small geographical areas.
For example, respondents consistently reported that poaching around the Volcanoes
National Park in Rwanda is largely (though not exclusively) undertaken by very
poor people, and this is largely for the subsistence economy. In this area, we can
be fairly confident that bush meat behaves as an inferior good. Across the border
in DRC, however, less is known about the profile of poachers, and demand for bush
meat is also affected by stronger markets owing to the number of soldiers in the
parks and the vicinity of a large town (Goma).
2. Physical Dependence. Some forms of income-generating activities are tied to
successful conservation. As a rule of thumb, if income from an activity would decline
as a direct result of forest degradation (e.g., beekeeping or ecotourism), it falls into
this category. The level of dependence can vary considerably. Ecotourism, for
example, relies on fairly strong protection of ecosystem functions and services,
and may even rely upon biodiversity itself, or upon the achievement of the principal
goal (in this case gorilla conservation). Beekeeping on the other hand may be less






























vulnerable to changes in the natural flora at the local scale (Steffan-Dewenter et al.
2002), unless marketing is contingent on some form of protective eco-certification.
The use of this type of conservation logic may only aid the design of effective
projects where sufficient income can be derived from the conservation-dependent
activity, that is, where the benefits are enough to tip the balance between choosing
to behave in ways that degrade the park and ways that conserve it. Beekeeper asso-
ciations interviewed in DRC and Rwanda report that interventions to assist with
quality control and marketing have led to higher prices (currently $2 per kilogram)
for refined honey sold through cooperatives. A typical beekeeper in the Rwandan
Forum des Apiculteurs des Volcans (FAV) was reported to have 6 traditional hives
producing an average of 10 kg per year each. The addition of a single modern hive
can add another 40 kg per year, making a total return of $200. This is believed to
be reducing the demand for collection of wild honey, which park authorities consider
a threat to the forest. In DRC we found a more mixed picture, owing to the difficult-
ies of sustaining economic enterprise amid the looting and population movement
arising from continued war (fortunately, the situation has improved during 2009).
IGCP and its predecessor, the Rwandan-based Mountain Gorilla Project,
played a key role in the introduction of gorilla tourism in the region. Against con-
siderable opposition, it was argued that the generation of income should be an
important part of the strategy to prevent the conversion of forest to agriculture
(Weber and Vedder 2001). The argument for income generation was largely about
changing government attitudes to forests, but also about raising the income of
forest-adjacent populations. With the latter in mind, IGCP initially helped to advo-
cate for revenue sharing in Uganda, and later in Rwanda. The Ugandan scheme was
piloted in 1994 and then a less generous scheme was institutionalised within the
Uganda Wildlife Statute in 1996, distributing approximately US$47,000 in 1996, ris-
ing to US$71,000 in 2006. In Rwanda, a similar scheme launched in 2005, distribut-
ing US$29,000 that year and US$136,500 the following year. While ecotourism’s
sustainability is indeed dependent on park conservation, the authorities in Rwanda
who operate this scheme report two concerns about this conservation logic. First, the
selection of projects to fund with this money is driven by district officials who select
social infrastructure projects such as roads and health care centers. The concern
expressed with such projects is that they are less valued by the poorest than by others
in the community. More significantly, perhaps, beneficiaries are not always aware of
the link between these projects and tourism and conservation. Where this link is not
well understood, there can be no perception that income is dependent on conser-
vation, and therefore the only available conservation logic is the basic income-
demand one. Second, the park authority is concerned that the decisions made by
local government do not always ensure distribution of benefits to the poor, and thus
the income–demand conservation logic is itself undermined.
Previous studies have tended to conclude that this type of conservation logic is
most likely to link and integrate conservation and development (Brandon and Wells
1992; Salafsky and Wollenberg 2000). IGCP’s experience with beekeeping, as well as
with water provision and tourism enterprises, suggests that this logic is a necessary
but often not a sufficient form of linkage, as we now discuss.
3. Contractual Obligation. Contracts that make benefits contingent upon
performance are increasingly used as conservation tools and there is a considerable
current research effort to understand the effectiveness of contracts in systems of






























payments for ecosystem services (Wunder et al. 2008; Milne and Niesten 2009).
When projects are not physically dependent on biodiversity conservation, or when
it is difficult to communicate such dependence, it is possible to introduce some con-
tingency to the provision of support, such that a form of dependence is established.
For example, IGCP has supported mushroom culture, an activity that is not physi-
cally dependent on forest conservation but, in principle, could be made so through a
contract that made support contingent upon performance of certain conservation
duties. Contracts can be formal; for example, IGCP’s support for the ecotourism
lodges includes environmental obligations in a legal contract. They can also be infor-
mal, as in the objectives contained in a strategic plan developed with the FAV bee-
keepers’ association. A contract can be defined as anything that clearly establishes
why the benefit is being provided and what is expected in return for this provision.
The lesson from IGCP’s experience is that ‘‘physical dependence’’ and ‘‘contrac-
tual obligation’’ can be combined to improve development–conservation linkage.
Many of IGCP’s community enterprises are either partly dependent on conservation
of intact ecosystems (e.g., beekeeping), or wholly dependent on conservation (e.g.,
ecotourism). However, dependence of an activity on biodiversity conservation is
often backed up by explicit forms of contingency: You will receive this development
support if and only if you agree to provide this support for conservation. For
example, support for beekeeping outside the forest is contingent on beekeepers
removing hives from inside the park, ceasing collection of wild honey, and excluding
active poachers (though not ex-poachers) from being beneficiaries. Community tour-
ism lodges provide a similar example. Ecotourism is clearly dependent in the long
term on the conservation of mountain gorillas and their habitats, but this logic
is—for example, in the case of the Nkuringo eco-lodge—backed up by a formal
contract that contains provisions such as the requirement for all parties to endeavor
to conserve the forest. What should also be apparent is that these two forms of con-
servation logic are also aligned with the income–demand logic because all of these
initiatives seek sustainable enhancement of income. The limitation of introducing
contingency is that it requires monitoring in order to support its enforcement. We
now consider the broader contribution that monitoring data makes to IGCP’s ability
to link conservation and development using the mechanisms discussed.
How Can Monitoring Systems Support Improved Linkage Between Conservation
and Development Objectives?
IGCP supported the design and introduction of ranger-based monitoring (RBM) in
DRC in 1997 and in Rwanda and Uganda in 1998. While it is primarily a tool to
monitor wildlife and to support law enforcement, it has recently been used to assist
with targeting of community conservation interventions. There are a number of
examples of the use of georeferenced RBM data to target community conservation
initiatives in ways that ensure they are driven by a conservation logic. First, ranger
data identified locations where many people were using the park during the dry sea-
son for water collection. These locations then became priorities for provision of
alternative supplies. Second, identification of locations with high densities of bee-
hives in the park provided a rationale to support beekeeper associations. Third, fol-
lowing human–gorilla conflict in the Nkuringo area of Bwindi, the location of nests
was mapped, identifying gorilla movements outside of the park boundary. This led
to prioritization of land use changes such as crops that are less susceptible to gorilla






























foraging and to prioritization of the already-mentioned ecotourism lodge to increase
economic benefits from the park.
While many respondents recognize the potential to use RBM to prioritize,
design, and monitor community projects, it is recognized that this potential is not
yet fully realized. Currently, RBM is not geared toward enforcement of contingent
behaviors detailed in formal and informal agreements, although plans to monitor
socioeconomic indicators, in addition to threats to the park, are likely to improve
the future capacity to do this. Enforcing contingencies would also benefit from
efforts to make the monitoring of threats more systematic, for example, by monitor-
ing randomly selected transects. While this would strengthen the credibility of evi-
dence for changes in park use behavior, conservation authorities and NGOs have
to consider the costs associated with such a shift from more opportunistic sampling,
which is often driven by tip-offs and which may be more cost-efficient for immediate
law enforcement objectives.
In What Ways Is Community-Level Conservation Logic Supported by Cross-Scale
Conservation Management?
While community-level learning and intervention are critical for conservation,
linkages across institutional scales are also vital (Berkes 2004). The following analy-
sis identifies some common scale-related problems for community conservation and
provides examples of how these have been addressed in the Virunga-Bwindi region.
Mismatch Between Local Priorities and National Institutions. As is well
established in literature, work with local communities can be frustrated by poorly
aligned or inadequate national legal or policy provisions (Martin and Lemon
2001). For example in the past, the need to link gorilla conservation with local liveli-
hoods was not supported by policy frameworks that enabled local people to benefit
financially from gorilla tourism. As previously stated, IGCP advocacy at the
national level, with its logistical support for revenue sharing, was intended to help
align national institutions with priorities to support local livelihoods. A second
example is law enforcement. IGCP has brokered a formal understanding and estab-
lished a Transboundary Core Executive, paving the way for more effective landscape
level law enforcement. While this may seem remote from community interests, the
two are in fact closely linked. Communities typically value law enforcement, as rules
are essential to the functioning of local institutions (Gibson et al. 2005) and because
they increasingly find themselves with (informal) responsibilities to help reduce
illegal activities. As several respondents suggested, communities can become
disenchanted when they see perpetrators escape across borders due to lack of
transboundary collaboration.
Mismatch Between the Scale at Which a Problem Presents Itself and the Scale at
Which Intervention Is Required. Community conservation has often suffered from
the fact that local management cannot deal with large-scale problems or problems
that require wide networks (Poteete and Ostrom 2001; Rutagarama and Martin
2006). This kind of conservation problem can often be compounded by problems
of information—where information is collected at an inappropriate scale and cannot
shed light on the problem. For example, in the Virunga massif, an increase in human
conflicts with elephants and buffalo was reported in DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda.






























These problems initially appeared as discrete events that required community-level
responses. However, communication among rangers established a likely association
between these events. For security reasons, the Mwaro corridor between Mikeno and
Nyamulagira sectors in DRC had been deforested, cutting off normal migration
routes and leading to unprecedented crop raiding by elephants (Gray and Kalpers
2005). Cross-scale partnership had enabled information to be analyzed at a scale that
matched the scale of the conservation–development problem.
Mismatch Between Location of Costs and Benefits of Conservation. Costs such as
crop raiding tend to be felt locally, while some of the greatest benefits from conser-
vation (biodiversity, carbon storage, hydrological services) are enjoyed at a range of
scales up to the global (Adams et al. 2004). Thus, work with communities can benefit
from institutional mechanisms that create ‘‘bridges’’ across scales. Bridging institu-
tions can help with the sharing of information and other resources (Cash et al.
2006). For example, in 2005 IGCP brokered a transboundary agreement for sharing
tourism income between countries to reflect the roving nature of the resource and to
reduce the tensions that previously arose when gorillas crossed borders. The conser-
vation dividends from this arrangement are already showing. For example, in
September 2008, a group of habituated gorillas crossed from Bwindi in Uganda to
an adjacent forest reserve in DRC, causing concern due to the prevalence of hunting
snares in the location. However, under the current momentum toward transbound-
ary collaboration, both the institutional framework and the interpersonal
relationships between park staff help to make it acceptable for Ugandan rangers
to cross the border and to monitor the gorillas, enabling cooperative resolution of
the problem. Importantly, arrangements at the transboundary scale can provide
some resilience to the unpredictability of both nature and society, making revenue
sharing more stable in all countries, as evidenced by the fact that DRC has in recent
years received revenue from gorilla tourism despite the fact that war in North Kivu
prevented gorilla tourism in PNVi up until 2009.
While international agreement has institutionalized gorilla tourism benefit
sharing between states, the distribution of benefits within and between local com-
munities proves difficult. On the one hand, the nature of benefits from
park-dependent activities is only ever likely to make a minor contribution to social
development and this will fall directly on relatively few individuals: Only a small
minority will work in IGCP tourism operations or make a living from IGCP
supported associations for handicrafts, mushroom cultivation, or beekeeping. Most
of those working in mountain gorilla conservation acknowledge this constraint,
accepting that parks in such a densely inhabited location cannot be expected to pro-
vide the principal economic dynamic for adjacent populations. However, while
mainly accepting the limitations of park-based income generation, there remains a
concern about who benefits and who does not, especially where it is perceived that
the most vulnerable people are not among the minority who benefit most. This is a
concern that we previously expressed in connection with the state-managed revenue-
sharing systems. Gorilla tourism revenue is also distributed to communities through
IGCP’s public–private partnership arrangements for eco-lodge operations in
Uganda and Rwanda. The first eco-lodge was constructed at the base of
Mt. Sabyinyo, PNV, and opened for business in August 2007. The lodge is owned
by the Sabyinyo Community Livelihoods Association (SACOLA), which has
granted a 15-year lease to a private company to operate the business. The Kenyan






























company Musiara Ltd. is contracted to pay a ‘‘bed-night fee’’ of $50 plus 7.5% of
income. Between August 2007 and February 2008, SACOLA received US$34,500.
Another ‘‘community lodge’’ was completed in late 2008 at Nkuringo and is oper-
ated by Uganda Safari Company. The greatest challenge for these partnership enter-
prises, in terms of ensuring benefit sharing, will be to ensure that local government
and other relatively powerful interests do not obstruct pro-poor uses of income.
IGCP and its partners are acutely aware that failure to ‘‘get the institutions right’’
in this respect could undermine any of the conservation logics that underpin its pro-
ject designs.
Conclusions
The ability to link development interventions to conservation outcomes (the conser-
vation logic) appears to be strongest where development outcomes are dependent in
the long term on successful conservation. This finding partly agrees with earlier work
such as Brandon and Wells (1992) and Salafsky and Wollenberg (2000), but we also
cite examples of IGCP projects that show that while this logic may be an important
design component for linking conservation and development, it may not be a suf-
ficient one. One solution is to combine it with contractual linkages that render devel-
opment benefits contingent on the expectation of certain conservation duties. In
contexts where it is possible to achieve this combination of linkage mechanisms,
there appears to be scope to design ‘‘win–win’’ projects—though we stress the signifi-
cance of context and do not present this as a blanket solution. One of the important
contexts in the IGCP case is the capacity to collect and analyze ranger data relevant
for identifying, designing, and monitoring community conservation projects across a
range of scales. For conservation practitioners without such extensive involvement in
monitoring it might be possible to explore collaboration that could enrich the infor-
mation base upon which community interventions are designed. Another context
that we have argued to be significant is the linkage across scales of analysis and inter-
vention. Conservation and development costs and benefits accrue at different scales,
typically with costs borne locally while benefits are enjoyed at higher scales. Linking
conservation and development requires policies and institutions (transboundary
collaboration, revenue sharing, social protection) that can serve to reconcile such
asymmetries.
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